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Abstract 
This paper investigates the process of cross-national diffusion of work systems to 
affiliate firms of three Japanese MNCs in the UK. It examines the degree to which 
structural, cultural and control-related work systems of the source company are 
adopted by the recipient. The case studies highlight the interplay between institutional 
forces and organizational action through a process of work systems translation. The 
study is based on a systematic comparative analysis of the ways in which Japanese 
work systems are implemented and sustained in the given firms. It concludes that 
firms attempt to translate alternative work systems rather than submit to 
environmental pressures towards isomorphism. The process of diffusing work systems 
is not driven by pre-existing legacies alone. There is room for social action in that 
actors, through their interaction, contribute actively to shaping the work organization. 
.  
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Introduction 
A multiplicity and diversity of institutional arguments have had in common the 
questioning of conventional organizational theories that rely on understanding 
organizations as essentially closed systems, working to a logic of efficiency, context-
free rational agency and/or ‘one-best-way’ in organizational structuring and operating 
(Djelic 1999). The dominant emphasis within institutional theory has been on 
structural isomorphism as an important consequence of both competitive and 
institutional processes (e.g. Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio 1988). Most of the 
institutional theorists view institutions as the source of stability and order (Scott 
2001). There is the common belief that firms mimic a particular practice that they 
consider highly effective and efficient (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In other 
words, organizations are driven to incorporate practices and procedures defined by 
prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work that are institutionalized in 
society. This implies a set of ‘best practices’ for organizing work systems cross-
nationally where firms are treated as repositories of capabilities or competence, and 
knowledge is seen as an objectified commodity (cf. Teece and Pisano 1994).  
 
The historical institutionalist variant of institutional theory, which the present study 
adopts, rejects the very idea of isomorphism and ‘set[s] out to account for the 
peculiarities of a given national system of industrial production and for persistent 
structural differences across national boundaries’ (Djelic 1999:7). It takes the social 
constructionist position that assumes that capabilities and preferences, that is the very 
nature of actors, cannot be understood except as part of some larger institutional 
framework. Social relationships and the impact that collective norms have on these 
relationships are examined in conjunction with the historical underpinnings and 
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structural embeddedness of the given ties. This implies that the diffusion of work 
systems from one institutional context to another can be constrained by persistent 
differences in patterns of organizing, role of social structures and unintended 
outcomes of power struggles. Consequently, this study adopts the view that the 
diffusion process is a context-dependent activity which is shaped by the interrelated 
aspects of structure and management-worker relations and social networks in a 
process. It can be influenced by social pressures associated with the diversity in 
beliefs, practices and social expectations that can hinder the continuation of a practice 
(cf. Dacin et al. 2002). Tensions created by actors can lead to change in routines, rules 
and practices (Scott 2001). 
 
Recent work has sought to address the relative inattention to the role of interest and 
agency in shaping action by acknowledging variation and change in institutional 
logics (see the special forum in AMJ, vol. 45, no. 1). Several studies have shown 
organizational members as active carriers of institutions (e.g. Townley 2002; Zilber 
2002). In other words, actors perceive the meaning of institutions and infuse their 
actions with meaning based upon these perceptions. The present study contributes to 
this line of research by highlighting the dynamics of how alternative work systems are 
shaped by the adopter firm. The aim is to reflect the active process of accepting and 
approving alternative ways of operating, or infusing work systems with value 
(Kostova 1999) as it is observed in the attitudes of workers. Work systems are defined 
here as organizational practices that are the product of over three decades of 
continuous improvement in Japan, driven by people’s knowledge, ideas and 
suggestions. They acquire a social meaning shaped by the institutional context, as 
they are enforced by public opinion, by knowledge legitimated through the 
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educational system, by social prestige and by laws (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The 
study investigates the extent to which work systems diffused from ’highly co-
ordinated’ contexts to ‘compartmentalized’ institutional settings are accepted and put 
to use. It examines the degree to which institutional and organizational variation 
between Japan and the UK influences the attitudes of workers to Japanese work 
systems in the UK. 
 
The following section discusses the institutional legacies of Japan and the UK and 
assesses the degree to which the institutional gap between the two influences the 
diffusability of work systems. In the third section, research design and data collection 
are discussed. The factors that are critical to the adopters’ acceptance of and their role 
in translating work systems are presented in the fourth section. The final section 
presents the implications of the analysis for institutional theory.  
 
Institutional Legacies of Japan and the UK  
The dominant practices of firms in relation to work systems, reward systems and 
employee governance combine to form distinctive configurations that may be 
identified as a ‘national business system’ (cf. Whitley 1999).  
 
The institutional profile, or the regulatory, cognitive and normative institutions (Scott 
2001), that shape continuous improvement practices is one of high co-ordination in 
Japan. The highly co-ordinated national business system of Japan nurtures collectivist 
values and tightly-knit networks that encourage low strike activity, absenteeism and 
turnover. The norms governing trust and authority relations promote close links 
between managers and employees and allow for greater informal participation in 
 5
decisions compared with ‘western’ plants (cf. Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990). The 
Japanese system of corporate management, such as employment stability and strong 
employee identification with the company, is seen as encouraging commitment to 
small-group activities (e.g. Tolich et al. 1999). Although Japan’s employment 
practices are currently in a state of change, triggered by the Asian financial crisis of 
the early 1990s, they are still seen as having positive implications for participative, 
hands-on management; commitment to continuous improvement activities; team work 
and on-the-job training. There are few indicators that speak of any ‘radical 
transformation’ in the Japanese workplace at this point (Dirks et al. 2000). 
 
By contrast, compartmentalized business systems discourage co-operation between 
business partners, including superordinates and subordinates. Management’s desire 
for control over many key operating decisions and arm’s-length relations between 
actors in Britain have reinforced a basic conflict model of the workplace in which 
strike activity, absenteeism and turnover have been common occurrences (cf. Lane 
1996; McMillan 1996). Low employment security in connection with low investment 
in skills development hinders technical co-operation and trust formation.  
 
Firms in compartmentalized business systems are more willing to invest major 
resources abroad to manage risk and uncertainty (Whitley 1999).  As they are not 
dependent on other actors in a business network, they are more likely than co-
operative ones to move assets across sectors and gain experience of managing diverse 
activities. Knowledge of such firms tends to be highly mobile given their inclination 
to standardize work procedures. By contrast, it is argued that firms in highly co-
ordinated systems such as Japan find it difficult to diffuse firm-specific advantages to 
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foreign affiliates, for they are strongly embedded in social networks of close co-
operation and high interdependency (cf. Whitley 2001). In other words, highly 
localized, context-dependent work systems can be ‘sticky’ to diffuse to other 
institutional contexts (cf. Szulanski 1996).  
 
 
Against this background, the study investigates the diffusion of continuous 
improvement schemes from Japan to the UK. It examines the active agency of UK 
affiliate firms in response to the diffusion of continuous improvement techniques such 
as team-based work organization and philosophies such as the values of team ethos 
and personal and cultural control or social investment that extends well beyond 
hierarchical principles. .  
 
The institutional and organizational levels are addressed in an effort to consider the 
contextual embeddedness of work systems (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
 
If the institutional context alone was addressed, then one would expect similar 
outcomes in the degrees of adoption of work systems in each firm. This would be to 
ignore any possible variation in the degree to which Japanese work systems are 
adopted across firms located in the same sector within a single country. In an attempt 
to capture this variation, a comparative study of two subsidiaries and a partner firm of 
three Japanese MNCs in the UK is carried out. The adoption of alternative work 
systems is understood here as representing a process of translating existing work 
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systems to yield appropriated work systems or the blending of ‘new’ work systems 
with existing ones (cf. Clark 1987). Translation itself is understood as 
‘transformation, modification, change, renovation, and identity construction—a 
blending of the foreign and the local, the new and the old’ (Tsui-Auch 2001:719).     
 
Research Design and Data Collection 
The study examines the diffusion of continuous improvement practices from a large 
and two medium-sized Japanese companies to their subsidiaries and partnering firm in 
the UK. Three qualitative case studies were conducted to attain a rigorous comparison 
of the diffusion process. It was felt that a systematic comparison of two subsidiary 
firms alone would not have provided diversity in the investigation of the likely 
influences on the adoption of alternative work systems. Three cases could yield more 
data than two cases where flow and configuration of events and reactions influencing 
a particular degree of adoption of work systems would become clear. A replication 
study was necessary whereby ‘successive cases [could be] examined to see whether 
the new pattern matche[d] the one found earlier [in the first case study]’ (Huberman 
and Miles 1998:195). Each case was selected to produce contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons to attain ‘theoretical replication’ (cf. Yin 1994). According to Yin, 
at least four cases need to be designed to pursue two different patterns of theoretical 
replication. There was not a case similar to the Rover-Honda collaboration in the UK 
automotive sector, thus a fourth comparable site could not be added to the sample. 
The Rover-Honda collaboration was a complex alliance in the sense that R&D, 
manufacturing, development and sourcing of parts were joint. The marketing and 
sales were the only separate areas (cf. Faulkner 1995). Thus the aim was to strike a 
balance between collecting data that allowed for rigorous analysis and avoiding data 
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overload in the field, ‘leading to the analysts thus missing important information, 
overweighing some findings, skewing the analysis’ (Huberman and Miles 1998:198).  
 
The research sites were selected with the intention to include a brownfield subsidiary, 
a greenfield subsidiary and a technical collaboration site in an effort to address the 
need to incorporate the social context in which organizational practices are embedded. 
All of the three firms were located in the automotive manufacture sector. This sector 
lent itself to investigating the limits to diffusing ‘Japanese best practices’, for the UK 
automotive manufacture sector was heavily influenced by Japanese investment, 
particularly in the 1980s. 
 
The data were obtained from a field study employing 73 open-ended and semi-
structured interviews conducted between August 1998 and April 2000 at both the 
Japanese and UK companies. Information was sought on the meaning that continuous 
improvement techniques and philosophies had for UK adopters. Field observations 
and on-the-job discussions with operators guided the collection of data on the degree 
of adoption. Where the alternative practice is compatible with existing work systems, 
one would expect operators to accept the practice with little resistance. Consequently, 
the degree of adoption was measured as high where operators ‘infused [alternative 
practices] with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand’ (Selznick, 
1957: 17).   
   
 Interviews were conducted with Japanese advisors, directors, UK team leaders, 
operators, electrical engineers, and managers across personnel and training, sales and 
marketing, product engineering, design and quality, finance, purchasing, logistics 
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operations, the liaison office and manufacturing integration at the UK sites. Further 
information was gathered through one week’s work experience in the two factories. 
Factory tours and interviews with Japanese electrical engineers and managers in 
international operations, product development, general affairs, quality assurance, 
corporate finance, engineering, corporate planning and control and design 
departments in Japan also served to enhance ‘analytic realism’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1998).  
 
Protocols (Yin 1994) incorporating schedules of company visits and members to be 
interviewed were developed. The majority of the interviews were taped and 
transcribed. Seven Rover, one Nissera UK and four Teniki UK interviews with British 
respondents were not taped as the conditions under which the interviews were 
conducted were not suitable for recording. Notes were taken during the interviews 
with Japanese participants owing to the language difficulty and the researcher’s 
sensitivity to the trust-building mechanism inherent in the Japanese society where 
heavy emphasis is placed on goodwill trust that forms over time. Note-taking also 
allowed Japanese respondents to demonstrate the issue at hand by sketching it on 
paper.  
 
The analysis of data reflects Djelic’s (1998 based on John Stuart Mill’s two-sided 
comparative method) two-step comparative historical analysis. It combines detailed 
case studies with systematic comparison. Detailed case studies ensure that ‘historical 
and contextual singularities are not being disregarded’, and systematic comparison 
‘allows for a significant theoretical leverage and represents a powerful tool, thus 
making generalization possible’ (Djelic 1998:14). In-depth case studies highlighted 
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the conditions underlying a given degree of adoption of Japanese work systems. 
Interview transcriptions and observation notes were scanned to generate a list of 
tentative sub-themes under the main themes of team-based structure, team ethos and 
personal and cultural control identified in the literature as having an impact on 
employee perceptions of work organization (see Saka 2003, where the practices are 
labelled as structural, cultural and control-related). Iterative loops of adding and 
amending sub-themes led to those that were identified as the most important in 
explaining the diffusion process. The triangulation of data and pattern-matching of 
key explanatory characteristics across the three cases validated themes. A ‘method of 
difference’ was adopted for comparing cases with different degrees of adoption. 
‘Instead of comparing different instances of a phenomenon, to discover in what they 
agree, this method compares an instance of its occurrence with an instance of its non-
occurrence, to discover in what they differ’ (Mill 1974:391). By comparing divergent 
cases, the researcher was able to identify, in Djelic’s term, ‘bundles of conditions’ that 
accounted for variations in outcomes. This approach reflects Eisenhardt’s (1989) 
coupling of within-case data analysis with cross-case patterns for a more sophisticated 
understanding or Boyatzis’ (1998) identification of themes within samples and their 
comparison across subsamples.  
 
A valid picture of the phenomenon under investigation was attained through 
theoretical saturation (see Glaser and Strauss 1967 for a definition). In addition, the 
study adopted a multilevel approach, investigating work systems diffusion at the 
institutional and organizational levels. This was useful in saturating categories of 
incidents. It is argued that a multilevel approach is necessary to provide a 
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representative account of a complex organizational phenomenon as that of cross-
national diffusion of work systems (e.g. Kostova 1999).  
 
One of the sites in the sample, Teniki UK (a pseudonym), represents an acquisition of 
a British firm by a Japanese car component manufacturer in 1996. The middle-sized 
company was run by a group of directors with limited sales and limited product types, 
and weak control prior to the acquisition. Teniki UK’s senior management was 
replaced with customer-focused, quality-conscious team upon full Japanese 
ownership. This team was advised by six Japanese expatriates in technical and 
development, operations, sales and marketing areas.     
 
The second site is a greenfield investment dating back to 1988. The company, Nissera 
UK (a pseudonym), employing 300 people in 1999 had 60 per cent Japanese 
employees in the early years of its foundation. This figure was reduced to the current 
12 Japanese managers in senior director and manager roles in engineering and 
finance. They served to facilitate communication between the subsidiary and parent 
company. Over time, British managers filled in production roles that were previously 
occupied by the Japanese.   
 
The final site in the sample is the technical collaboration between Rover and Honda, 
which was formed in 1978 as part of a strategy to increase economies of scale and to 
serve customers in the European market. Although there have been a series of 
collaborative projects over the course of Rover’s partnership with Honda, this study 
focuses on the Rover 200/Honda Concerto (coded the R8/YY) project, as this 
constituted ‘side-by-side’ work rather than an arm’s length relationship. The R8/YY 
project was seen by Rover engineers and senior managers as the most successful 
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project in terms of the degree of collaboration, quality and process improvement, 
problem resolution and learning benefits. It also made a significant contribution to 
returning Rover to financial profitability and marked the highest level of introduction 
of Honda practices at Rover.  
 
Patterns of Work Systems Diffusion 
Findings show that practice adoption varies across foreign affiliates as a result of the 
institutional gap between the home and host countries, and the differences in 
organizational initiative in the active diffusion of alternative means of operating. 
Adopters at Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration were more successful in 
institutionalizing meaning to continuous improvement techniques and philosophies 
than those at Teniki UK. The amount of agency or Japanese expatriate managers’ 
ability to alter rules was lower at Teniki UK.  
 
Continuous Improvement Techniques 
All three firms initiated a structural change to reduce levels of hierarchy in the 
organization. The previous structure at the two subsidiaries was set up along the line 
of superintendents, supervisors and hourly-paid workers. Superintendents, who 
reported to the factory production manager, had a wide span of control over hourly-
paid workers. There was a significant change in authority relations to reduce costs and 
supervisory autonomy with the introduction of team leader and coach positions. At 
Rover, a project-based structure was adopted with the launch of the R8/YY project. 
The shift from a functional structure created an opportunity to build team spirit among 
the engineers. This was ingrained in the saying ‘you have got a spirit and motivation 
of not wanting to let each other down. It gives you a bit more drive and impetus’ 
(Rover design and development engineer). A project-based structure was seen as the 
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best way to deliver a project, for technical problems could be solved accurately and 
quickly through consultation with a central group of expertise which could not be 
sustained under a functional structure.  
 
Although the operators at the two subsidiaries did not perceive a major difference 
between the new and old organizational structure, those at Nissera UK were more 
receptive to accepting the change in authority relations. By the same token, the active 
adoption or the strong belief in and recognition of the value of a structural change was 
also evident among Rover engineers.  
 
Before its acquisition in 1996, Teniki UK ran operations to low quality standards and 
efficiency levels and had poor management-worker relations.  
In the past, it was a lot in the head. There was an autocratic process. ‘I 
want you to do this, do that, because that person knows what is supposed 
to happen’. My approach is democratic. People need to know what is 
going on, so that they can feel part of the business and make their own 
decisions. (Operations manager at Teniki UK) 
However, even after the acquisition, the lines of demarcation between functions and 
management and workers remained strong. The low skills level of the workforce and 
indirect involvement of Japanese expatriates in shop-floor activities challenged the 
acceptance of teamwork. Whereas at Nissera UK, the high concentration of Japanese 
expatriates in the early years after the company’s establishment helped enhance UK 
operator skills. However, the original meaning of a team-based structure with fluid 
descriptions in Japan was translated by UK adopters. Team leaders who were 
perceived as occupying managerial positions by the operators and higher management 
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had clearly defined responsibilities in the UK context: ‘team leaders do not do the 
work. As long as they make sure the system is in, what comes out is efficiency, cost 
and quality’ (Production manager at Nissera UK).  
 
Adopters’ role in translating a project-based structure at Rover could be observed in 
the greater control exercised by functional than project managers. There were 
conflicting interests between functional managers and project leaders, in that, the 
former preferred to avoid risks, whilst the latter wanted to take risks to develop 
innovative products. There was still a top-down approach, and Rover managers 
continued to be hands-off. Moreover, Rover had problems holding weekly meetings 
with every project leader because its engineers were based in three separate sites; 
Cowley, Canley and Longbridge. Although communication improved with the 
establishment of a design centre in Gaydon for all the engineers, the timing of the 
build phases still could not match that of Honda.  
We agreed on a schedule. Rover could not understand this schedule, 
could not understand how to manage or carry out their own job. Honda 
sets up a project manager to manage the timing. They control the 
progress of the team. They also receive the services of a support function.  
      (Japanese executive vice president of Honda R&D Europe) 
Honda was able to operate a project-based structure much more effectively, 
‘delivering projects at the same time as having specialists’ (Rover design director).  
 
Continuous Improvement Philosophies 
Teniki UK, Nissera UK and Rover found it difficult to develop and replicate ‘esprit de 
corps’ of continuous improvement activities. Their efforts to invest high degree of 
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ownership of quality circles, discipline in the workplace and ‘5C’ housekeeping 
principles of classifying, clarifying, cleanliness, clean-up and custom in the hands of 
‘self-contained’ teams met challenge.  
 
There was a variation in team ethos across the three firms. For example, the low 
emphasis on training and control on the shop floor at Teniki UK created the space for 
particularly the older operators to work according to their own rules. They 
manipulated scrap rate figures under production pressures. ‘Quality Assurance is 
called over when there is a supplier-related problem. If there is pressure to get the 
order out, then they will pass the item that I would normally scrap’ (assembler at 
Teniki UK). Small group activity or Kaizen could not be successfully implemented at 
Teniki UK, for the training and development plan had not yet instilled a continuous 
improvement culture. The previous ownership focused on teaching skills that were 
related to an operator’s immediate task rather than the overall production process. 
Although job training under Japanese management was typically provided internally 
and included consultation with staff, the UK adopters did not have ‘the skills bottom 
up to top, we cannot achieve this sustainable continuous improvement within the 
plant’ (Teniki UK operations manager). There was more emphasis on training 
engineers and greater focus on developing National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) 
levels than continuous improvement philosophies among operators. ‘Teniki UK is 
located in an area popular for farming and armed forces. It is not an industrial 
location, so the education level is not that high. 60 per cent of the people have not 
more than three GCSEs [Graduate Certificate for Secondary Education]’ (British 
personnel and training manager at Teniki UK). Furthermore, the four Japanese 
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advisors who were in a position to train operators were preoccupied with start-up 
projects, hence, felt that they did not have the time to invest in training.  
   
Although the acceptance and approval of team ethos was greater at Nissera UK than 
Teniki UK, it had not acquired the same symbolic and normative meaning as that at 
the Japanese parent company. The local management was perceived as being 
ineffective in running quality improvement ideas that were, in themselves, seen by the 
operators as beneficial: ‘ideas are good but the outlook, seeing it through is crap 
(operator in cluster assembly at Nissera UK).  
We were forced to go on this course [on quality circles]. They called it 
‘family circle’. It is a big joke. Everything is a joke. It could be better if 
they were straighter with us. As far as we are concerned, they have 
deceived us. They will start with something and if it does not suit them, 
they will change it. (Operator in cluster assembly at Nissera UK) 
Operators did not subscribe to quality standards. The author’s work experience on the 
shop floor showed that out-of-control quality measures were recorded as falling 
within tolerance levels. The low sense of responsibility for quality control processes 
was also observed in component testing. Operators found tests on fuel and 
temperature indicators that normally took seven minutes to complete too long, thus 
ended the tests prematurely. Although the quality control systems as Nissera UK were 
similar to those at the Japanese parent, ‘[O]ver the past two years, we have tended to 
go back to the Japanese parts. Every single part needs to meet quality standards. In the 
UK, the attitude is out of a million, surely there can be a few defects’ (Japanese 
quality director at Nissera UK).    
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At Rover, the psychological ownership of continuous improvement schemes was low 
until the initiation of the R8/YY project. Rover engineers could identify with and be 
involved in these schemes as more collaborative projects were carried out with Honda 
engineers. ‘As the project went on, we were more and more subtly encouraged to go 
the Honda way on everything. In essence, we adopted our specifications to meet theirs 
at the end of the day’ (principal electrical engineer at Rover). There was a willingness 
to exert considerable effort for the implementation, as well as a strong desire to 
continue the use of, Honda practices such as the gebba-kai process (i.e. quality circles 
adopted by engineers to solve problems at the end of each build phase) and formalized 
build phases. However, the gebba-kai practice was translated by the UK adopters to 
shorter meetings and fewer participants attending problem resolution sessions. Hence, 
there was the rise of a new configuration of meanings, resources and actors with the 
diffusion of the gebba-kai process. Although the intention was to have an internal and 
an external gebba-kai that lasted in total for two days as at Honda, Rover had 
‘changed it a little bit for the worst’ (British senior manager in manufacturing 
integration at Rover)This was seen as the influence of people who had not been 
directly involved in joint engineering works for 6-12 months with Honda engineers. 
The aim is to always arrive at a decision. I think if we followed it [gebba-
kai] literally and the way some of the Honda engineers worked, then yes, 
we would always arrive at a decision because they would not leave 
without a decision. (Design and development engineer at Rover).  
Rover’s build phases were formalized to match Honda’s evolutionary process in car 
development.  
Learning from Honda was that you must go through a process of 
evolution and all the components that fit into the vehicle must be off-tool 
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and off-process. One of the requirements that Honda laid down was that 
the more you practised, the better the product.  
(Principal systems engineer at Rover)  
However, Honda’s methodical steps in delivering components contrasted with 
Rover’s relatively ad hoc approach. Processes had been tested before, hence there 
were clear reasons as to why Honda engineers strictly abided by them. By contrast, 
Rover engineers tended ‘to look for compromise and modify as appropriate or we feel 
we have to because we have money constraints’ (principal systems engineer at 
Rover). Rover engineers found it difficult to work in a regimented manner and to 
abide by an agreed structure, lacking self-discipline to rigorously train people and test 
and stabilize processes (senior manufacturing integration at Rover.  
Again we might not have the discipline that they adopt in terms of the 
PCR changes. PCRs are supposed to be all resolved and signed off at the 
[gebba-kai] event. But not everybody turns up. So we might not have the 
discipline to fully do it, but we still basically adopt it. (Principal electrical 
engineer at Rover) 
At times Rover’s adoption of alternative work methods was constrained by its long 
tradition of working with existing methods. This is exemplified by the differences in 
engine design requirements of Rover and Honda.  
[Rover] had many connections in the engine. They installed engine ECU 
[Electronic Control Unit] under the bonnet. Engine harness was 
connected directly to the engine ECU. In Japan, we clamp that wire 
connection to prevent small vibrations from negatively affecting the 
ECU. Rover design did not incorporate this. The English have lots of 
experience [i.e. long tradition] of working without this clamp, so they 
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asked ‘why do we need it? It will increase cost’. At the end, we could not 
come to a compromise. (Principal engineer at Honda) 
 
In addition to the variation in team ethos, the extent to which personal and cultural 
control was exercised through direct supervision and the use of expatriates at the three 
firms differed. Both Teniki UK and Nissera UK experienced high levels of control in 
technical and strategic affairs. However, Japanese expatriates were not visible in the 
management of factory activities at Teniki UK as they were at Nissera UK. They 
rather had a short-term outlook to developing capabilities owing to the financial 
pressure exerted on Teniki by a major car manufacturer. They emphasized clear-cut 
quantitative objectives in both strategic and operational decisions. Hence, there was 
an exercise of impersonal and technocratic control through output  and planning (cf. 
Harzing, 2001).   
Teniki [Japanese parent company] have pressure on them to put pressure 
on ourselves to make the returns faster than normal. In that case, we have 
had to have very stringent sort of budgetary control and cutting of 
budgets which would affect the long-term, that is the training budgets are 
not as good as they should be in my belief. (British operations manager at 
Teniki UK)  
The majority of products at Teniki UK were designed around Japanese processes.  
They still require us to put in place best practice processes such as U-
shaped cells, Single Minute Exchange of Dies (SMED), assembly cells 
where minimum stock levels of product are within reach, ergonomically 
designed. So they expect best practice. However, achieving some of the 
best practices is problematic. (British operations manager at Teniki UK) 
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The heavy involvement of Japanese expatriates in technological and financial 
decisions was also evident at Nissera UK. The UK subsidiary was required to report 
to Nissera discussions on major managerial issues such as annual shareholder 
meetings and significant organizational changes. These were then discussed at the 
parent company within the framework of efficiency checks against investment. The 
high degree of involvement of Japanese managers in the diffusion of continuous 
improvement schemes contrasted with that at Teniki UK. Unlike that at the 
brownfield site, there was an emphasis on direct supervision and international transfer 
of managers or, in Harzing’s (2001) terms,  personal and cultural control at the 
greenfield site. However, Nissera’s commitment to broad range and long-lasting effort 
to create the dedicated human and organizational capabilities decreased as its UK 
subsidiary failed to develop its own knowledge base and satisfactory financial results.  
First time I was in the UK, we brought know-how with documentation 
and information [such as quality standards, instruction manuals, quality 
control process charts and drawings]. Japan did not send any know-how 
after that. Their manufacturing is old and manual, so we cannot transfer 
know-how…Since 1993, Nissera UK has had bad profits. They could not 
manufacture anymore. (Japanese quality assurance manager at 
headquarters).  
Japanese control at Rover was of personal and cultural nature as that at Nissera UK, 
but it was exercised through socialized, informal communication and management 
training rather than direct supervision owing to the nature of the collaboration. 
Rover’s liaison officers facilitated information flow and helped forge good working 
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relations with the Japanese. Engineers saw it as essential to build social relations 
based on trust, for ‘you could have a discussion and there would be lots of nodding 
and agreeing, and it did not mean they agreed with what you were saying’ (principal 
electrical engineer at Rover). The main concern was not whether information flowed 
back and forth, but whether the message was conveyed correctly and this depended on 
a working relationship with Honda engineers.  
As you got to know more and more of their engineers, and they got to 
know us, we would be designing things in the pub afterwards with Honda 
engineers. We would draw a design on beer mat, pass it over to a Honda 
engineer. He would improve it and give it back to me. That would spark 
another idea in him and we shake on that. And then the next day, he 
would draw it up. We used to do a lot of our work like that. (Principal  
engineer at Rover) 
 
Discussion  
The findings at Teniki UK, Nissera UK and the Rover-Honda collaboration reveal 
that there are considerable differences in the diffusion of Japanese work systems 
owing to i) the institutional distance between home and host countries  and ii) the role 
of interest and agency in shaping action.  
 
At the institutional level, the operational autonomy provided to individuals in small-
group activities strengthened by a sense of groupism in large firms in the Japanese 
automotive industry conflicts with the low worker discretion and sense of 
individualism that has traditionally strengthened the management hierarchy in the UK 
automotive industry. This is exemplified by Teniki UK: ‘In Japan, employees are 
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grateful for being given a project to do. However, in the UK, there is demarcation, 
unionization. Employees will ask “why ask me to do the project?”’ (personnel and 
training manager at Teniki UK). The experience of developing interdependency, trust 
and shared knowledge is unique to a specific workplace, context and group of people 
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. 1998). Thus, all three companies in the sample had  
difficulty imparting continuous improvement schemes by securing the commitment of 
all parties to the process owing to the institutional variation between the demands of a 
highly co-ordinated business system that encourages high interdependency and a 
compartmentalized business system that discourages collaboration and co-operation. 
The level of acceptance and approval of Japanese source companies’ practices was 
high where habitual routines and pre-existing organizational setting were redesigned 
to integrate alternative work systems through company visits, cross-functional 
teamwork and the active participation of Japanese expatriates as boundary-spanning 
individuals. As Tsang (2001) shows, the coaching role of expatriate managers is 
crucial in cases where substantial cognitive change is required. For example, at Rover, 
staff in liaison roles dedicated to the development of the collaboration and joint 
meetings that allowed for co-ordination through lateral communication and 
negotiation rather than hierarchy were used as integration mechanisms. Nissera made 
heavy use of expatriates as a means to bring its UK subsidiary ‘into the fold’, that is to 
establish an organizational culture that aligned with the parent company’s values 
(Jaeger 1983). In comparison, Teniki UK had the least number of Japanese expatriates 
available for training who tended to be hands-off in management. Hence, the 
resistance to alternative work systems was the greatest among Teniki UK operators. 
This was also, in part, associated with particularly older operators’ preference for 
traditional British work organization of union activity and craftsmanship. ‘We need 
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the trade union down here to improve the work environment’ (senior operator in Air 
Element at Teniki UK). In line with Tsang’s (2001) argument, old routines hampered 
the diffusion of knowledge and discouraged the materialization or institutionalization 
of new ideas. 
 
At the level of the organization, actors’ role in shaping acquired knowledge was 
evident in the collective translation of meanings that were woven into a shared frame 
of reference (Hayes and Allison 1998). This alludes to the notion that the adoption 
process is a product of human activity that is socially defined (see Berger and 
Luckmann 1967). In line with Kostova and Roth’s (2002: 229) argument, the ‘depth 
of adoption within organizations is not necessarily driven by rational, efficiency-
based decisions, but can be better explained in terms of the interpretive social 
processes through which employees build perceptions about the efficiency of a 
practice’. Action could not be habitualized in instances where the original meaning of 
path-dependent and firm-specific Japanese work systems could not be shared by the 
UK adopters. For instance, the process of enculturating team spirit was more difficult 
to articulate than change in authority relations along a team-based structure. Where 
practices were likely to have behavioural consequences such as in ways of working 
and inter-relating, or to initiate systemic change in Child and Rodrigues’ (1996) 
terms, the adoption of work systems was more difficult. The creation of common 
meanings and identities was much easier where continuous improvement activities 
could be codified or structured into a set of identifiable rules and procedures such as 
Honda’s project-based work organization rather than the sense of discipline required 
to carry out gebba-kais. These practices were basically techniques that did not require 
a major change to either people’s behaviour or the pattern of relationships between 
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them (cf. Child 1994). In accordance with Ackroyd et al.’s (1988) view, initiatives 
mediated by the orientation of British management were less straightforward in their 
effects. The Japanese emphasis on the human element of knowledge production at the 
operational level was not upheld by the UK managers who tended to emphasize 
knowledge that was easy to measure and control. The limited interaction through 
actions of individuals to synthesize knowledge in the UK business system (Hedlund 
and Nonaka 1993) tended to inhibit the extent to which continuous improvement 
philosophies could be infused with value at the three companies. 
 
The cognitive process of interpreting actions and structures is highlighted in the 
blending of old and new practices. Alternative work systems are evaluated in the light 
of existing organizational practices and adopters’ own assumptions concerning 
effective ways of operating. Foreign practices fight their way through a 
‘semipermeable organizational membrane, consisting of existing power networks, 
organizational culture and subcultures, in order to influence the existing set of 
organizational visions’ (Doorewaard and van Bijsterveld 2001:61). There is editing or 
translation where ‘successes’ are reformulated and ascribed new meanings as they are 
diffused, that is ideas are recontextualized as they are disembedded from their original 
context. Rules of  ‘social control, conformism and traditionalism’ direct the 
translation process (cf. Sahlin-Andersson 1996). The introduction of gebba-kai 
problem solving sessions exemplifies a translation process whereby ‘external 
knowledge/artefacts/methods [were] “fused” with internal 
knowledge/procedures/systems’ (Hislop et al. 1998:430). 
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Historical institutionalism offers no amplification on how institutional forces interact 
with actors’ social responses. Its emphasis on regularity and stability rarely builds in 
the role of the collective or individual actor. As is revealed by the case studies in this 
paper, the adoption of work systems can be ‘blocked or facilitated by the nature of 
cultural infrastructure and the role of human agencies’ (Loveridge 1987:193). The 
infusion of work systems with value is an active process involving actors’ decisions to 
accept new ideas, where ‘human agents…are creating and applying these symbols, 
interpreting these meanings and formulating, conforming to, disobeying and 
modifying these rules’ (Scott 1994:60). Continuous improvement schemes were 
interpreted by UK operators upon their diffusion to a new setting. Their utilization or 
development required the active involvement of those workers who possessed it. The 
reconceptualization of knowledge took the form of a dynamic interaction among 
episodes of external acquisition of knowledge, its use by firms and the commitment 
by firms to the extent that the acquired knowledge assumed taken-for granted nature, 
or the attachment of a symbolic meaning and value by adopters to the practice as have 
the employees from the home country.  
   
Findings demonstrate that not only broader institutional belief systems or logics, but 
also the interpretive schemes and interaction patterns of actors shape practices.  The 
role of actors in shaping alternative systems is particularly visible where there is lack 
of management initiative in emphasizing training and in adopting a strong approach to 
discipline. For example, older workers at Teniki UK failed to fill in production 
timesheets on an hourly basis: ‘I do it at the end of the day and take an average. It 
looks better that way’ (senior operator in air element at Teniki UK). Whereas at 
Nissera UK, Japanese managers were hands-on with training and directly involved in 
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factory activities. There was also the availability of financial and human resources at 
Nissera UK that were not readily accessible at Teniki UK. Teniki UK’s financial 
flexibility was constrained for it  had not yet achieved economies of scale and 57 per 
cent of its parent company’s shares were held by a Japanese car manufacturer. The 
impact of key company and organizational factors, in addition to that of local 
institutional characteristics, are discussed in detail elsewhere (see Saka 2002).   
 
At Rover, inter-personal, inter-firm networks, along with communication and joint 
decision-making mechanisms, were used for co-ordination and integration (Grandori 
and Soda 1995). The interpretation of Honda practices required heavy involvement in 
training to break ‘method[s that were embedded] in individual expression’ 
(manufacturing integration manager at Rover). There was a high level of training in 
quality skills and the car development system, as well as direct involvement in joint 
development processes with the Japanese. ‘People transfer’ through company visits 
served as a medium for trust building and learning (cf. Pucik 1996).   
 
Where there was the presence of actors interacting intensely to diffuse work systems 
and heterogeneous—physical, financial and human—resources available to support 
continuous improvement techniques and philosophies such as that at Nissera UK and 
Rover, the adoption of alternative work systems was high (see figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The degree of adoption of Japanese work systems at the UK adopter firms depended 
on the nature of the diffused practices, availability of physical, financial and human 
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resources, and level of interaction between the actors involved, that is the role of the 
boundary-spanning individuals in the diffusion process. Actors, resources and 
activities in figure 2 are linked by social networks that have an important role in the 
acceptance and approval of practices (e.g. Newell and Clark 1990). Team-based 
structures, team ethos and the exercise of control through visibility in management are 
perceived as standardized models to be imitated in the absence of resources and actors 
aiming actively to diffuse both continuous improvement techniques and philosophies.   
 
Conclusion: Institutional Embeddedness of Organizations 
The findings at the three companies highlight the cultural and structural barriers to the 
diffusion of Japanese work systems. The diffusion process is examined in relation to, 
first, the institutional legacies that shape work systems, and second, the role of agency 
in determining how organizations interpret and respond to alternative practices. There 
is partial integration of generally conflicting practices that are embedded in 
institutional sources of organizational structure and culture. Teniki UK displayed a 
high level of resistance to Japanese work systems. By contrast, adopters at Nissera 
UK and Rover-Honda collaboration were relatively more receptive to alternative ways 
of operating owing to the availability of resources and the active role of boundary 
spanning individuals diffusing both continuous improvement techniques and 
philosophies. 
 
The research findings contribute to historical institutionalism by highlighting the 
historical influences of a business system on the subsequent development of 
institutional arrangements as well as the apparent role of meanings connecting actors 
to actions. Studies in institutional theory predominantly allow little room for variety 
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of response, for resistance, for efforts to change commonly held belief and established 
rules (Scott 2001). This study diverts the attention to the role of active agency. It 
demonstrates ‘the capacity for individual and collective actors to act and pursue 
independent goals’ (Hirsch 1997:1714). Highly context-dependent work systems are 
translated upon their diffusion to a different national business system. There is an 
enactment through social patterns of interaction in organizations. Organizations are 
not simply driven to incorporate practices and procedures defined by prevailing 
rationalized concepts of organizational work. As the case studies show, there is not a 
standard pattern of accepting alternative work systems. This contrasts isomorphism 
arguments where adopter firms copy a particular work that they perceive as best 
practice (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Although there is evidence to suggest that 
‘path-dependent’ distinctiveness of national forms of capitalist organizations still 
apply (Ferner 2000), firms are not as uniform within each capitalist system as is 
suggested by authors such as Orrù et al. (1991). Alternative work systems are edited, 
hence reflect interpretive processes, in accordance with situational circumstances and 
constraints as they are diffused.  
 
Note 
I would like to thank Muğla University, Turkey, for the financial support it has 
provided, as well as my respondents for showing genuine interest in and support for 
the research. 
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Figure 1.    Cross-national Diffusion of Work Systems 
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Figure 2.  Network Framework Conducive to High Adoption of Work Systems  
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